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ODIOUS DEBTS AND NATION-BUILDING:  
WHEN THE INCUBUS DEPARTS
Lee C. Buchheit* and G. Mitu Gulati**
People tend to think that because we changed all the politics in four days, we can
change the economy in four days.  Well, we can’t.  It will just have to take a little
more time.1
I.  THE BEOWULF SYNDROME
We learn the pattern in the nursery.  A village, a town, a shire languishes for
generations under the oppression of a monster, a giant, a dragon, a wizard.  Despair
and helplessness blight the landscape until the sudden appearance of a deliverer.  Jack
kills the giant.  Harry Potter vanquishes Lord Voldemort.  Beowulf overpowers
Grendel.  Dorothy melts the Wicked Witch of the West.  Once the source of the evil
is removed, the dark enchantment lifts, the flowers blossom again, and the children
laugh once more.  All live happily ever after.
The appeal of these stories lies in their simplicity.  The cause—the sole cause—of
the people’s suffering can be traced back to a single point of origin.  Extinguish the
source of that evil and, in one stroke, felicity and fecundity return.
II.  OUTSIDE THE NURSERY
History offers numerous examples of the operation of the Beowulf Syndrome
outside of the nursery.  When a society is victimized for a sufficiently long period of
time by an oppressive or corrupt regime, the temptation to ascribe all of the ills of the
society to that one source gradually becomes irresistible.  The despot can become, in
the minds of the people, the wellspring of the totality of their suffering.  However
improbable it may be as a matter of etiology to trace every social disorder back to a
nasty government, there is something in human psychology that apparently yearns to
do so.
The stage is then set for the appearance of that equally familiar phenomenon:
revolutionary disillusionment.  When the dictator is suddenly removed, particularly if
the removal is at the hands of the long-suffering citizenry, folks just naturally assume
that their lives will improve—dramatically, palpably, and promptly.
It rarely happens that way.  Sometimes the revolution merely replaces one form
of tyranny for another: Robespierre for the Bourbons, the Bolsheviks for the Tsars, the
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Ayatollah for the Shah.  Sometimes the new regime, even if well–intentioned, is
incapable of delivering on the explicit and implicit promises that helped bring it to
power.  (A law of political gravity also operates in these situations.  The higher the
new leaders allow public expectations to rise, the more painful is the inevitable crash
back to earth.)  An example is the Cory Aquino administration that took office in the
Philippines following the People Power revolution against Ferdinand Marcos in 1986.
Mrs. Aquino was an honest (a refreshing change from Mr. Marcos), but relatively
ineffectual leader.  Sometimes chronic human frailties—egotism, incompetence, envy,
greed, parochialism, and so forth—become visible in the officers of the new
government, gradually staining the image of the successor regime.  Those traits were
probably always present, of course, but they may have been temporarily eclipsed by
the meridian glare of the revolutionary moment.  The bickering among the Founding
Fathers following the American Revolution is a case in point.
Whatever the cause, the result is usually disillusionment, and occasionally
profound disillusionment.  This has been a nearly universal theme when nation-
building is accomplished through a dramatic substitution of a corrupt or dictatorial
regime.
III.  THE DEVIL AND ALL HIS WORKS
In the first flush of euphoria following the overthrow of an oppressive regime, the
new administration will want to fumigate the premises.  Old political appointees will
be fired.  Collaborators and sympathizers will have their heads shaved, figuratively and
sometimes literally.  Laws and decrees associated with the ancien régime may be
revoked.  In extreme cases, even the constitution may be rewritten.  The behavior of
the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq in 2003 is a splendid example of this
cathartic impulse.2
But there is one souvenir of the former regime that may not be so easy to
expunge—the debt obligations incurred by the prior government in the name of the
state.  Public international law, with few exceptions, requires a new government to
recognize the debts incurred by its predecessors, however dissimilar in political form
or philosophy those predecessors may have been.3  So in this one area—debt
contracts—the former despot will continue to keep a chokehold on the country long
after the devil and his other works have been buried.
IV.  THE MORAL CONTEXT
To most people, the notion that the citizens of a country lucky enough to have
ousted a dictator should spend the rest of their lives paying off the debts incurred by
that dictator in the name of the state is morally repugnant.  This is a situation in which
a strict requirement of the law (that governments automatically succeed to, and must
480 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:2
4. See Press Release, Governing Council of United Nations Comp. Comm., Governing Council of
United Nations Comp. Comm. Has Concluded Its Fifty-Sixth Session (June 30, 2005).  For more
information on the operations of the UNCC see The United Nations Compensation Commission,
http://www2.unog.ch/uncc/start.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2008).  
5. See Matthew Martin, Banks Reject Baghdad’s $30bn Debt Plea, MIDDLE EAST ECON. DIG., Nov.
23, 2007, at 24 (quoting an Iraqi official as saying, “[t]he regime of Saddam Hussein is now gone and
Kuwait is at peace with the people of Iraq . . . . Why does it continue to force Iraqis to pay for the crimes
of the old regime?”).
6. Additionally, in purely economic terms, the external creditors are better risk bearers or cheaper cost
avoiders than the suffering populace.  See generally Omri Ben-Shahar & Mitu Gulati, Partially Odious
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honor, the debt obligations of their predecessors) is incongruent with most people’s
sense of the morally right outcome.
At a superficial level, state responsibility for debts incurred by prior governments
resembles the belief that a country carries a collective responsibility for the crimes or
wars perpetrated by prior governments of that country.  The Allied Powers represented
at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 certainly demonstrated their belief in this
version of collective responsibility.  It did not matter to them that the German Kaiser
had fled and his government had fallen—the German people had to be made to pay.
In our own day, the damage caused by Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 has resulted
in more than $50 billion of reparation awards handed down by the United Nations
Compensation Commission.4  Shortly after Saddam Hussein was deposed in 2003, the
new Iraqi Government began to agitate for those awards to be reduced or nullified.
The argument?  The Iraqi people were co-victims of Saddam’s tyranny.  It would be
morally reprehensible to saddle them with the obligation to compensate Saddam’s
other victims as well.5
But the similarity to other types of state collective responsibility is only
superficial.  The significant difference between foreign debts incurred by a prior
regime and damages or injury inflicted on foreigners by such a regime is that, in the
debt example, the foreign creditors chose to lend their money while the regime was in
power.  The odious (to use a word) characteristics of a prior regime—the very
characteristics that fuel a sense of moral outrage when citizens are asked to assume the
debts of such a regime once it is displaced—were presumably visible to a lender when
it elected to advance money.  So, the argument goes, such a lender is in the position
of a collaborator whose head, or at least whose wallet, is subject to righteous shaving
by the incoming administration.  In contrast, it is difficult to portray the victims of
state-sponsored crimes or aggressive wars as somehow complicit in the behavior of the
perpetrators of those acts.6
V.  THE ODIOUS DEBT DEBATE
The proximate cause of the current debate about whether public international law
recognizes a “doctrine” of odious debt was the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003.
Individuals at the extreme ends of the political spectrum (the Bush Administration neo-
conservatives on one side and the non-governmental organizations championing third
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world debt relief on the other) both argued that Iraq’s Saddam-era obligations fit a
legal category of odious debts, a category, they claimed, that had a basis in customary
international law.7  More recently, the debate has moved from the activist realm to the
academic.8
This debate about governmental succession to odious debts is complicated by the
fact that one side (the activists who began the discussion) is talking mostly morality,
and the other side (the academics, practicing lawyers, and policy makers), mostly legal
and economic realities.9  The proponents of the idea that debts incurred by (now
supplanted) odious regimes should be cancelled are responding to what they see as a
moral imperative; something very akin to the presumption of the Beowulf Syndrome
that when the source of the evil is vanquished, all of the baneful effects of that evil
should automatically dissipate.10
The creditors’ response to these ethical arguments is predictably legalistic.  They
point to the black letter of the loan agreements or bond indentures—documents that
invariably contain representations about the legal, valid, binding, and enforceable
nature of the contracts.  They point to the strict public international law rules
governing the inheritance of state debts incurred by prior regimes.  They talk, also in
quasi-religious tones, about the sanctity and inviolability of contracts.11 
Sovereign debtors have not usually gotten very far with purely ethical arguments.
Even if the creditors may feel a twinge of conscience about having lent to a distasteful
regime, they are unlikely to admit it publicly.  Bilateral government lenders that
eagerly finance sales of equipment, often military equipment, to client countries, argue
that they cannot be too fastidious about the nature of the regimes governing those
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countries.12  If they were, they would not sell much hardware.  Finally, many of the
debt instruments evidencing these credits are traded in the secondary market.13  A
third-party purchaser of such an instrument is comfortably removed by the assignment
chain from whatever ethical qualms may have, or should have, troubled the originator
of the loan.
As a result, the proponents of the theory that odious debts should be carved out
from the normal requirement of state/governmental succession to debt obligations have
recently opted to engage their creditor counterparts in equally legalistic terms.  The
emotional propellant for their response may be moral outrage, but the language is now
legal.  The ingredients for this legal porridge, however, are astonishingly meager.
They comprise mainly a debate between two colonial powers, Spain and the United
States, about responsibility for the debts of Cuba in 1898,14 the writings of an obscure
law professor of the early 20th century,15 and a single arbitral award of the same
vintage.16
VI.  NATION-BUILDING AND ODIOUS DEBTS
Many countries that have ousted dictatorial regimes have hoped that their
experiment in revolutionary nation-building would be accompanied by a cancellation
of the debts incurred by those regimes.  The Aquino administration in the Philippines,
for example, was initially beset by calls for “selective repudiation” of corrupt loans
incurred while Marcos was in power.17  Mrs. Aquino’s first minister of finance, Jaime
V. Ongpin, even expressed the hope that once the country’s foreign creditors realized
that the old crooks had been thrown out, the creditors would want to support the new
government by offering, or at least accepting, debt relief.18  This may sound quixotic
twenty-one years (and many sovereign debt workouts) later, but at the time many
people believed that right would eventually make might, even in the area of sovereign
debt.
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21. The Brady Initiative, sometimes referred to as the Brady Plan, was a strategy implemented by the
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22. When asked in 1986 whether he believed the Government had “dispelled all the worries about debt
Argentina in the 1980s experienced something similar.  After the ruling military
junta was replaced by a populist government under President Raul Alfonsin in 1983,
the new government initially announced that creditors would not be paid until the
legitimacy of their debts to “the generals” had been determined.  A June 1984 letter of
intent submitted to the IMF stated that the debt “had been contracted by the means of
arbitrary and authoritarian policies in which the creditors had actively participated and
which did not bring benefits to the Argentinean people.”19
Following the removal of Saddam Hussein in Iraq in 2003, the Iraqi National
Assembly passed a resolution supporting the recommendation of its Economic and
Finance Committee that Iraq should assert the doctrine of odious debts in connection
with Saddam’s debts.  The recommendation (which bears the fingerprints of an NGO
drafter) stated:
The previous regime accumulated a heavy burden of foreign debts to states
which financed the tyrant’s wars against his people first, and then against our
neighbors.  The foreign loans helped him build a huge military apparatus and
manufacture weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons that he used
against the Iraqi people in Halabja.  The loans supported his system of oppression and
paid for his palaces and prisons during the war against Iran when Iraq’s oil revenue
was extremely low. . . . 
There is a strong basis in international legal principle and precedent to define
these debts as being “odious” and thus not legally enforceable.  This legal doctrine
of odious debt was formulated in the 1920s by Alexander Sack, a former Russian
Minister working as a legal professor in the Sorbonne University in Paris.  He
published the most extensive and important works on the treatment of state debts in
the event of regime change.20
In any event, neither Cory Aquino’s Philippines, Alfonsin’s Argentina nor Iraq’s
post-Saddam Interim Government pressed a legal argument for debt cancellation based
on the allegedly odious character of the debts left by the prior regime.  The reasons in
all three cases were pragmatic.  The Philippines was at the time (1986) in the middle
of a conventional debt restructuring/new money exercise with its commercial bank
creditors.  Five years later, the country would significantly reduce its stock of
commercial bank debt, and stretch out the repayment of the balance, pursuant to the
so-called Brady Initiative.21  The Government concluded that a policy of selective
repudiation of certain loans was likely to derail its efforts to obtain debt relief through
more conventional channels.22
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The Argentine experience was very similar.  Here is President Alfonsin’s
explanation in 1987, several years after taking office:
We maintained that we should not pay that which we regarded to be the illegiti-
mate part of the debt because it had originated from irregular credits . . . but in the
concrete exercise of power, things did not turn out this way and only in a very small,
in fact irrelevant, number of cases could we effectively prove that we were dealing
with this type of loan.  It was therefore actually impossible to carry on with a policy
of distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate loans.23
For its part, the Interim Government of Iraq in 2004 enjoyed strong support from
some of its allies for a massive write-off of the country’s $140 billion Saddam-era debt
stock.24  But the justification for such a high level of debt cancellation was eventually
articulated in gritty economic and geopolitical terms, not legal (odious debt) terms.
Iraq’s Minister of Finance at that time, Adil Abdul Mahdi, was bluntly asked in an
interview whether “any of Iraq’s sovereign debt [is] odious debt that can or should be
repudiated entirely?”  Minister Mahdi answered the question in this way:
Iraq’s need for very substantial debt relief derives from the economic realities
facing a post-conflict country that has endured decades of financial corruption and
mismanagement under the Saddam regime.  Principles of public international law
such as the odious debt doctrine, whatever their legal vitality, are not the reason why
Iraq is seeking this relief.25
His successor as Iraq’s minister of finance, Ali A. Allawi, published an article the
following year in which he summarized, in openly sympathetic terms, the moral
argument for a repudiation of Saddam’s debts:
Widely different views have been expressed about the appropriate treatment of
Iraq’s Saddam-era debts.  Some have argued that all of this debt, in view of its
provenance, should be classified as odious and cancelled outright.  Lend to a despot,
they say, and you should expect repayment only from the despot.  If a country
manages to free itself from the incubus of an odious regime, the citizenry should not
be forced to carry the burden of that regime’s immoral extravagances for generations
to come.26
By the time Minister Allawi published his article in 2005, however, Iraq had
struck a deal with its large bilateral creditors that called for an 80% cancellation of
Saddam-era debts.27  The principal argument Iraq used to support its request for debt
cancellation on such a vast scale was political, based on the need to restore stability
in Iraq, and not on moral grounds or on the legal doctrine of odious debts.28
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A similar scenario played out after the demise of the apartheid regime in South
Africa.  Outrage at foreign financial support for that regime was never translated into
retributory action against the lenders once the regime fell.  Why?  The familiar story:
a debt repudiation, however justifiable in moral terms, would have impaired the new
government’s ability to attract the foreign capital needed for economic reconstruction.29
VII.  CONCLUSION
What lesson should be drawn from these experiences—that the incandescent
idealism of a “rebuilt” nation seeking relief from the debts incurred by its former
oppressors will inevitably crumble in the face of the conservatism and venality of the
country’s creditors?  We think not.  The moral case, the ethical case, the religious case
(if you are so inclined) for debt relief in these circumstances is too powerful to be
wholly ignored.  
Moreover, the avalanche of research and writing about the odious debt question
over the last four years has provided everyone involved with these issues (debtors,
creditors, NGOs, economists, politicians, and lawyers) with a much better
understanding of the historical precedents and theories supporting these arguments.30
The important question is how, not whether, countries that have shed themselves
of corrupt or despotic regimes can ensure that the debts incurred by the former regime
will not permanently blight the economic prospects of the rebuilt country.  The
Beowulf Syndrome leads naturally to an expectation that the debts will be eliminated
in one sweep of a terrible swift sword as soon as the dictator departs.  It rarely happens
that way.
Many heavily indebted sovereigns over the last quarter century have achieved a
significant degree of debt relief from both their official sector and commercial
creditors.  The conventional process for obtaining that relief, however, is admittedly
tedious and attenuated.  No one will ever be able to determine how much of the relief
granted to these countries was attributable to the creditors’ own sense of culpability
for having lent money, or at least lent so much money, in the first place.  But this was
surely an element in the deals cut for certain countries such as Iraq in 2004.
The public discussion about odious debts and its correlative principle of
“responsible lending” has therefore had a dollars and cents effect on recent sovereign
debt workouts, and will undoubtedly continue to do so in future cases.  The only
problem is that this effect cannot be quantified with precision nor—Beowulf
notwithstanding—does it manifest itself immediately once the source of the evil is
gone.  As Minister Ongpin said in the quotation that opens this Essay, “It will just have
to take a little more time.”31
